However, these aspects of the process may have proven counterproductive in the event of Brexit. The first aspect, the impending deadline, served to expose the risk of a disorderly withdrawal – and the economic consequences and risks associated with the Irish peace process – beyond the heads of the negotiating parties. The pressure of time to rush to a deal was further exacerbated by the real fear of Leave politicians and voters on the British side, which helped catapult Boris Johnson to 10th place: that Brexit could end up frustrated. Ironically, this fear became much more realistic after the Wightman decision, which confirmed not only the reversible nature of the section 50 process, but also the unilateral nature of such a reversal. Johnson was therefore a man in a hurry – after the success of the election slogan – “Get Brexit Done”. It seemed that he would not be able to make further renewal applications unless his hand was forced. The temptation of both sides to reach an agreement – however imperfect it may be – was therefore almost irresistible. DUP MP Sammy Wilson said he would be very happy if the government cancelled the withdrawal agreement, which he said threatened economic hardship for the region and disrupted trade with Britain. She said: “We are working hard to resolve the outstanding issues with the Northern Ireland Protocol through the Joint Committee and we will continue to approach these discussions in good faith.

The UK accuses the EU of being too tough on animal controls, and the EU accuses the UK of returning to an international agreement. This shocked many Members. But given the European Union`s inability to negotiate in good faith and its threats against Northern Ireland, the Prime Minister can rightly argue that it is not Britain that is violating its obligations under international law, but the EU. Not only is Brussels flouting its own obligations in the Withdrawal Agreement, but it is also undermining the Good Friday Agreement, which ensures that Northern Ireland`s constitutional status cannot be changed without popular consent. `The Withdrawal Agreement; it has been formulated to provide this guarantee for three key issues. citizens` rights, the UK`s financial obligations, but above all the element of Irish protocol is there to ensure that there is no return to a hard border on the island of Ireland,” he said. The possibility of the UK agreeing to withdrawal agreements in order to undermine them later could not be unknown to the EU. However, the restrictions on the material scope of a Withdrawal Agreement by Article 50(2) described above limited the extent to which it could protect itself against such action by the United Kingdom, as the Withdrawal Agreement could not create legally binding and detailed obligations with regard to the future economic relationship between the Parties. Article 184 of the Withdrawal Agreement obliges both the EU and the UK to “do their best [and] in good faith. to take the necessary steps to negotiate expeditiously the agreements referred to in the Political Declaration on Their Future Relations. However, even if an alleged breach of that obligation were to be tried in court, it would be very difficult to prove non-compliance to the best of one`s ability or an act in good faith […].